Roadmap / 0.1.2.5
Electricity exports
v0.1.2.5, commit 8ecd55c. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.5_electricity.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.
Switches: electricity.enabled (off by default, neutral when off), electricity.canada_cut (Canada stops exports), electricity.us_cut (US stops exports to Canada), electricity.provinces_in_objective.
Runs: 2,000 per variant, seed 20261105; weather, seasonal insurgency, DMP mobilization, potash and oil (no embargoes) on. Backtests unchanged (Iraq invasion 160 vs 139; occupation 3,539 vs 3,500). 13 tests pass.
Bug fix: the US draft used to overwrite earlier lasting shifts in US support (rogue-incident rallies); it now adds to them. This affects only runs with both a draft and such shifts.
What the module adds
Canada exported 32.7 TWh to the US in 2025 (C$3.3B, 0.4% of its goods exports) and imported 22.1 TWh; it supplies 81% of US electricity imports (CER). That is under 1% of US consumption, but it is concentrated: - New York City: the Champlain Hudson Power Express (1,250 MW) can meet ~20% of the city's demand, in service since May 2026. - New England: net imports were 13% of supply in spring 2026 with NECEC, up from 7% (ISO-NE market monitor). - Ontario: exports serve ~1.5M US customers in New York, Michigan and Minnesota.
Two facts shape the lever: - Drought. Hydro-Québec exports fell from 36 TWh (2021) to 15 TWh (2024) on low runoff. - Winter. Quebec needs its own power in winter: it curtailed NECEC during Winter Storm Fern in January 2026.
Flows also run north. BC imported 25% of its needs in fiscal 2024's drought.
Historical analogue. Ontario's 25% export surcharge (10 March 2025) lasted one day. The US answer was to threaten doubled steel tariffs and a "National Emergency on Electricity" — escalation, not concession.
How the module works (aggregates only; no line, converter-station or substation detail): - Hydro condition: a per-run drought draw scales what Canada can export. - Season: the export lever is weakest in winter and strongest in summer heat. - Canadian cut: - a small, non-cumulative drag on US support and GDP in the import regions; - in peak months, a chance of an attributable blackout that shifts US opinion lastingly, either way. - US cut: - a Canadian GDP loss that rises in drought; - winter load-shedding risk. - Prize: when the US holds the exporting provinces, part of the exports keeps flowing.
Results (chance the US quits)
| Scenario | off | on | Canada cuts | US cuts | both | all levers* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic coercion | 33.3% | 32.3% | 31.4% | 31.9% | 31.9% | 43.0% |
| Alberta detachment | 46.2% | 47.8% | 46.2% | 48.4% | 47.8% | 51.4% |
| Full annexation, manufactured rally | 19.0% | 19.6% | 20.2% | 18.8% | 19.6% | 23.0% |
| Full annexation, no casus belli | 64.4% | 63.8% | 64.8% | 64.5% | 64.8% | 63.3% |
*All levers = both power cuts + oil embargo + US cut to eastern oil + potash embargo.
Blackout-attribution sensitivity (economic coercion, Canada cuts power):
| If a blackout… | US quits | US wins | unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|
| is blamed on the president (−3 pts support) | 48.0% | 12.6% | 39.4% |
| has no lasting effect | 32.9% | 14.0% | 53.1% |
| rallies the US behind the war (+4 pts) | 23.1% | 15.7% | 61.3% |
Findings
- Cutting power does nothing reliable for Canada on its own. The price effect is tiny: about 0.5 points of US support at most, because Canadian power is under 1% of US use. What matters is the blackouts.
- The outcome depends on who gets blamed for the blackout. If Americans blame their president, the chance the US gives up rises from 33% to 48%. If they blame Canada, it falls to 23%. This belongs to the narrative layer (0.1.21b), not the grid, and it is the same pattern as raids on US soil: harm to American civilians tends to rally the US. The Ontario surcharge drew escalation.
- It is a summer weapon, not a winter one. This corrects the roadmap's earlier claim that winter power exports were Canada's biggest lever. Quebec and Ontario need their own power in winter, and Hydro-Québec cut NECEC in the January 2026 cold. The lever is biggest during New York and New England summer heat waves.
- Drought shrinks the lever. In a low-water year Canada has little to cut, and BC in particular depends on imports from the US.
- A US cut hurts Canada more than a Canadian cut hurts the US. It costs Canada about 1.2 points of extra peak GDP loss and causes ~1.5 winter load-shedding events over five years in coercion. Outcomes still barely move, again because the model links Canadian surrender only weakly to economic pain.
- Stacking every economic lever is what moves outcomes. All levers together raise the chance the US gives up under coercion from 33% to 43%. Electricity adds almost nothing to the oil and potash levers.
Weakest parameters
blackout_support_effect (decisive; modeller estimate), blackout_prob, hydro_condition, us_support_drag, can_gdp_weight.
Backlog this opens
- Make blackout attribution part of the narrative module (0.1.21b), using the same framing variables as the governor shock.
- Natural gas, the reverse dependency: Ontario and Quebec import about half their gas from the US.
- US repression and escalation rules (a "National Emergency on Electricity"-style response to a cut).
Sources
Canada Energy Regulator, 2025 Canada–US energy trade snapshot (May 2026) and 2024 snapshot; EIA Today in Energy (20 July and 5 Aug 2026); S&P Global (13 May 2026); ISO-NE market monitor via Acadia Center (Oct 2026); ISO-NE 2025 net energy for load; Hydro-Québec annual report 2024 via Energi Media; Blakes, CBC, Utility Dive on Ontario's March 2025 surcharge; BC Hydro import reporting (Electricity Forum, Global News).