Sources
Where every number comes from. 224 model parameters and 86 dated facts, each with its source line and the version that added it.
[1.0]How sourcing works here
- Facts about the two countries, their trade and their climate live in
data/, each with a value, a unit, an as-of date, a source and a confidence rating. - Model parameters live in
data/parameters/model.yamlas ranges, each with a source line. A test fails if one is missing. - A source line is not always a citation. 173 of the 224 parameters say, in words, that the number is the modeller's estimate. Those are tagged judgement. A cited range is still a judgement about which range to cite.
- Three inputs come from commissioned research reports (the NATO split, provincial politics, and how fast a region goes quiet). Those reports are analytical estimates from historical cases, not measurements, and are named as such where they are used.
- Source lines are short. They name the publication and year. Full reference lists for each module are in its results document, linked below.
[2.0]Facts
data/actors/canada.yaml
16 entries. File first appears in 0.1.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
population | 41,798,407 | persons | 2026-07-01 | Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0009-01, preliminary estimate for 1 July 2026 (released 23 September 2026); was 41.6e6 (2025) before v0.1.3.1 | high | 0.1 |
gdp_usd | 2.2 trillion | USD (nominal) | 2025 | CalChamber Canada trade portal (citing StatCan) | medium | 0.1 |
defence_spending_cad | 63 billion | CAD/yr | FY2025-26 | NATO defence expenditure report, 26 Mar 2026 (reported by National Post / Global News); ~2.0% GDP under broadened NATO definition | high | 0.1 |
regular_force | 67,827 | personnel | 2026-04 | DND/CAF backgrounder 'CAF reach highest recruitment in 30 years', 20 Apr 2026 | high | 0.1 |
regular_force_target | 71,500 | personnel | 2029 target | DND/CAF backgrounder, 20 Apr 2026 | high | 0.1 |
reserve_force | 30,000 | personnel (authorized) | 2026 | DND/CAF backgrounder, 20 Apr 2026 (authorized strength; actual effective strength lower) | medium | 0.1 |
land_combat_share | 0.35 | fraction of regular force available as deployable land combat/combat-support | 2026 | Modeller estimate — Army is ~1/3 of CAF; to replace with DND Departmental Results Report breakdown | estimate | 0.1 |
mobilization_plan_regular_augment | 85,000 | personnel (proposed) | 2025-12 | NATO Association of Canada, reporting on DND/CAF mobilization planning (proposal, not enacted) | low | 0.1 |
trade.exports_to_us_usd | 453.6 billion | USD/yr (goods + services, = US imports from Canada) | 2025 | BEA Table 1.5 via USAFacts | high | 0.1 |
trade.imports_from_us_usd | 426.3 billion | USD/yr (goods + services) | 2025 | BEA Table 1.5 via USAFacts | high | 0.1 |
trade.crude_exports_to_us_bpd | 3.9 million | barrels/day | 2025 | EIA Today in Energy #67904, 29 Jul 2026 | high | 0.1 |
primary_reserve_actual | 23,561 | personnel | 2025-05 | DMP directive figure (reported by Globe and Mail, The Deep Dive, True North) | high | 0.1.1 |
primary_reserve_dmp_target | 100,000 | personnel | DMP target (no date set) | DMP directive (Globe and Mail; CTV/BNN Bloomberg 20 Nov 2025) | high | 0.1.1 |
supplementary_reserve_actual | 4,384 | personnel (mostly retired CAF willing to return) | 2025-05 | DMP directive (Western Standard; The Deep Dive); still 'the current 4,384' in Ottawa Citizen, 16 Nov 2026 DND's Reserve Force components page says 'about 6,700' (undated). No source found for 4,135 (checked 17 Nov 2026). The difference has no effect on results (v0.1.3.6). | high | 0.1.1 |
supplementary_reserve_dmp_target | 300,000 | personnel (volunteers, initially public servants; relaxed age/fitness standards; ~1 week training; no uniforms) | DMP target (emergency) | DMP directive (CTV/BNN Bloomberg 20 Nov 2025; NPR 15 Dec 2025; True North) | high | 0.1.1 |
caf_applicants_fy2025_26 | 192,000 | applicants (1 in 13 completed the process, ~15,000 recruits) | FY2025-26 | NATO Association of Canada, 'Modernizing Canada's Reserve Force' (2026) | medium | 0.1.1 |
data/actors/united_states.yaml
8 entries. File first appears in 0.1.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
population | 340 million | persons | 2025 | Modeller estimate (Census Bureau order of magnitude) — replace with Census Vintage 2025 | estimate | 0.1 |
gdp_usd | 30 trillion | USD (nominal) | 2025 | Modeller estimate (BEA order of magnitude) — replace with BEA annual 2025 | estimate | 0.1 |
active_end_strength | 1.3 million | personnel | FY2026 NDAA | Military Times, 20 Jan 2026; CRS IN12651 (FY2026 NDAA active end strength) | high | 0.1 |
army_active | 454,000 | personnel | FY2026 | Military Times, 20 Jan 2026 | high | 0.1 |
marines_active | 172,300 | personnel | FY2026 | Military Times, 20 Jan 2026 | high | 0.1 |
reserve_and_guard | 772,000 | personnel | FY2026 | Military Times, 20 Jan 2026; CRS IN12652 | high | 0.1 |
sustainable_deploy_fraction | 0.33 | fraction of active ground force sustainable in theatre without mobilization (1:2 rotation) | doctrine | Modeller estimate based on Army force-generation dwell-ratio norms; to cite | estimate | 0.1 |
trade.crude_imports_from_canada_share | 0.6 | fraction of US crude imports | 2025 | EIA company-level imports 2025 (Canada ~3.8-4.0 Mb/d of ~6 Mb/d total) | medium | 0.1 |
data/alliances/nato_members.yaml
1 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.10.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
_meta | table: tiers, us_troops, gdp, frontline, delays, bands, group_correlation, caveats | Deep-research report 'How NATO Allies Would Respond if the US Coerced or Attacked Canada' (12 Nov 2026), sections 3.1, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.4. Tier probabilities, blocs, delays and correlations are that report's ANALYTICAL ESTIMATES, not forecasts; it notes they encode ordering and correlation more firmly than absolute levels. | 0.1.2.10 |
data/climate/canada_stations.yaml
8 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
stations.montreal | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Montréal–Trudeau weatherbox | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.toronto | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Pearson Airport weatherbox | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.winnipeg | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Winnipeg weatherbox | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.calgary | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Calgary weatherbox | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.vancouver | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Wikipedia 'Climate of Vancouver' | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.iqaluit | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Iqaluit weatherbox | 0.1.2 | |||
stations.fort_mcmurray | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Fort McMurray weatherbox (fetched 11 Nov 2026) | 0.1.2.6 | |||
stations.yellowknife | monthly normals | ECCC Canadian Climate Normals 1991-2020, via Template:Yellowknife weatherbox (fetched 11 Nov 2026) | 0.1.2.6 |
data/commodities/arms.yaml
3 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.8.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
canada_licence_holders | 2,473,661 | firearms licence holders (1,626,754 non-restricted; 794,768 restricted privileges), ~6% of population | 2025 | RCMP, 2025 Commissioner of Firearms Report | high | 0.1.2.8 |
canada_registered_restricted | 1,269,076 | registered restricted and prohibited firearms (long guns are not registered) | 2024 | RCMP, 2024 Commissioner of Firearms Report | high | 0.1.2.8 |
us_origin_crime_guns | Ontario: 91% of crime handguns recovered in 2024 came from the US (Ontario government via NYT, 2025); Toronto: 88% of crime guns smuggled in 2024, up from 51% in 2014. National RCMP tracing 2023: 80% of traced crime guns with known source were domestic, 20% smuggled. A US$500 handgun sells for up to C$5,000 in Canada | text | 2024 | New York Times (Dec 2025); PolySeSouvient summary of RCMP CNFTC data (June 2026); CBC (2025) | medium | 0.1.2.8 |
data/commodities/electricity.yaml
10 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.5.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
canada_exports_twh | 32.7 | TWh exported to US (35.7 in 2024, 49.4 in 2023) | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator, Overview of 2025 Canada-U.S. Energy Trade (27 May 2026); CER 2024 and 2023 snapshots | high | 0.1.2.5 |
canada_exports_value_cad | 3.3 billion | CAD per year (0.4% of Canadian goods exports) | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator 2025 trade snapshot | high | 0.1.2.5 |
canada_imports_twh | 22.1 | TWh imported from US, C$1.4B | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator 2025 trade snapshot | high | 0.1.2.5 |
canada_share_us_electricity_imports | 0.813 | share of US electricity imports supplied by Canada | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator 2025 trade snapshot | high | 0.1.2.5 |
hq_exports_history_twh | 36.2 (2021), 35.6 (2022), 23.0 (2023), 15.1 (2024); low runoff since 2023 | text | 2024 | Hydro-Quebec annual report 2024 via Energi Media | high | 0.1.2.5 |
chpe | 1,250 | MW HVDC Quebec -> New York City, commercial operation May 2026; up to ~20% of NYC demand; outages June-July 2026 | 2026 | S&P Global 13 May 2026; EIA Today in Energy 20 Jul 2026 | high | 0.1.2.5 |
necec_and_new_england | 0.13 | net imports share of New England supply, spring 2026 (7% in spring 2025); NECEC delivery obligation 9.55 TWh/yr; NECEC curtailed during Winter Storm Fern (Jan 2026) to meet Quebec demand | 2026 | ISO-NE Internal Market Monitor Spring 2026 report via Acadia Center (Oct 2026) | high | 0.1.2.5 |
ontario_us_customers | 1.5 million | US homes and businesses in NY, MI, MN served by Ontario exports | 2025 | Ontario government, March 2025 (CP24, SupplyChainBrain) | medium | 0.1.2.5 |
ontario_surcharge_analogue | 25% surcharge on Ontario exports to NY, MI, MN took effect 10 Mar 2025 and was suspended 11 Mar 2025 after the US threatened to double steel and aluminum tariffs and declare a 'National Emergency on Electricity' | text | 2025 | Blakes; CBC; Utility Dive (March 2025) | high | 0.1.2.5 |
bc_import_dependence | 0.25 | share of BC consumption imported in fiscal 2024 (13.6 TWh, record; drought) | 2024 | Electricity Forum; Global News (2024-25) | medium | 0.1.2.5 |
data/commodities/logistics.yaml
8 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.7.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ambassador_bridge | 25-30% of Canada-US trade, ~US$323-360M a day; Feb 2022 week-long blockade shut or slowed Ford, Toyota, Honda and GM plants on both sides within days; ~US$100-141M a day of auto trade | text | 2022 | The Conversation / U of Guelph (Feb 2022); Fortune (14 Feb 2022, Reuters, IHS Markit); CBC (Feb 2022) | high | 0.1.2.7 |
canada_veg_imports_us_share | 0.565 | US share of Canadian fresh/frozen field vegetable imports (C$2.31B of C$3.90B); 59.5% in 2024 | 2025 | Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Statistical Overview of the Canadian Field Vegetable Industry 2025 | high | 0.1.2.7 |
canada_fruit_imports_us_share | 0.36 | US share of Canadian fruit imports (vegetables 67%), 2010-2022 average | 2022 | UBC Canada Food Flows via CBC (2025) | high | 0.1.2.7 |
canada_produce_import_dependence | Canada imports 88% of fresh fruit and nuts and 72% of vegetables consumed; produce ~15% of grocery spending | text | 2026 | Federal food blueprint via The Packer (2026) | medium | 0.1.2.7 |
canada_pharma_imports_us_share | 0.308 | US share of Canadian pharmaceutical imports (Europe 33.5%, India 3.2%, China 2.9%) | 2024 | Statistics Canada via CTV/CP24 (July 2025) | high | 0.1.2.7 |
caf_ammunition | OAG (Oct 2026): strategic stockpile has 'significant gaps' against requirements that will take years to fix; C$9.2B over 13 years committed in 2024, no stockpile deliveries yet by Mar 2026. Former CDS Eyre: at Ukraine-like consumption 'we would be out in days in some cases'; NATO asks for 30 days of supply | text | 2026 | Auditor General of Canada, Report 24 (Oct 2026); CTV (2024); CBC (2023) | high | 0.1.2.7 |
f35_dependence | Major maintenance, overhaul and software upgrades on the F-35 happen in the US; no confirmed kill switch, but the US controls software, upgrades, parts and armament | text | 2025 | CBC (2025, Minister Miller); 19FortyFive (2025); DND spokesperson via scribe (2025) | medium | 0.1.2.7 |
rail_blockade_2020 | Feb 2020 blockades shut CN's eastern network (~1/4 of operations), cancelled 400+ trains, halted perishable food, chlorine and propane by rail; Quebec rationed propane with ~1 week of inventory; GDP hit pencilled at ~0.25% for the month | text | 2020 | Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2020; CBC; BNN Bloomberg (RBC estimate); Energy Now | high | 0.1.2.7 |
data/commodities/nato.yaml
4 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.8.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
article5 | Article 5 obliges each ally to assist an attacked ally but leaves each free to decide what action to take; the North Atlantic Council decides by consensus, so any member, including the attacker, can block a collective decision. The treaty has no procedure for one member attacking another and no expulsion mechanism | text | 2026 | NATO, 'Collective defence and Article 5'; Belfer Center explainer; Law & More treaty summary | high | 0.1.2.8 |
greenland_precedent | Jan 2026 (Operation Arctic Endurance): France, Germany, UK, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands sent small contingents to Greenland (France 15, Germany 13; Denmark ~350) as a tripwire against US pressure; the US answered with 10% tariffs on eight allies and said the troops would not affect its decision | text | 2026 | AP (15 Jan 2026); Euromaidan Press (15 and 20 Jan 2026); The Aviationist (16 Jan 2026) | high | 0.1.2.8 |
us_forces_europe | 80,000 | US troops in Europe (80,000-100,000; >36,000 Germany, >12,000 Italy, ~10,000 UK); NDAA floor 76,000; drawdown under way in 2026 | 2026 | AP via WTOP (May 2026); Air & Space Forces Magazine (June 2026) | high | 0.1.2.8 |
europe_dependence_note | US presence in Europe also projects US power to Africa and the Middle East (EUCOM commander, March 2026); Europe still relies on US enablers against Russia | text | 2026 | AP via KTAR (May 2026) | medium | 0.1.2.8 |
data/commodities/oil.yaml
11 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.4.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
canada_crude_to_us_mbd | 3.9 | Mb/d crude exported to US (90.1% of 4.3 Mb/d crude exports) | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator, Market Snapshot: Overview of 2025 Canada-U.S. Energy Trade (27 May 2026); EIA Today in Energy 29 Jul 2026 | high | 0.1.2.4 |
canada_crude_to_us_value_cad | 126.1 billion | CAD per year | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator 2025 trade snapshot (C$140.0B total crude exports, 90.1% to US) | high | 0.1.2.4 |
canada_share_us_crude_imports | 0.634 | share of US crude imports from Canada | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator 2025 trade snapshot | high | 0.1.2.4 |
padd2_canadian_share_of_crude_inputs | 0.73 | share of Midwest refinery crude inputs that are Canadian (2.8 Mb/d); >70% of US imports of Canadian crude refined in Midwest | 2024 | Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 'Canadian oil important for Midwest gasoline prices' (2025) | high | 0.1.2.4 |
padd2_heavy_replacement_note | Landlocked Midwest refiners cannot easily replace Canadian heavy crude; Capline reversed in 2021 so Gulf heavy crude cannot move north | text | 2025 | S&P Global Commodity Insights, 31 Jan 2025 | high | 0.1.2.4 |
canada_production_mbd | 5.35 | Mb/d crude and equivalents; Alberta 83.8%, Saskatchewan 8.2%, NL 4.5%, BC 2.8% | 2025 | Canada Energy Regulator, Market Snapshot: record crude oil production in 2025 (17 Jun 2026) | high | 0.1.2.4 |
tmx_capacity_mbd | 0.89 | Mb/d nominal; ~94% utilized Q2 2026; +90 kb/d expected end-2026 | 2026 | Trans Mountain fact sheet Jul 2026; RBN Energy Aug 2026 | high | 0.1.2.4 |
canada_non_us_crude_exports_mbd | 0.43 | Mb/d | 2025 | Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada via Gulf News 2026 | medium | 0.1.2.4 |
line5_eastern_dependence | Line 5 (Superior WI -> Sarnia, through Michigan) supplies >50% of Ontario refinery feedstock and is a critical source for ~2/3 of Quebec's crude via Line 9; all Enbridge routes to Sarnia cross US territory | text | 2025 | Canadian government filings reported by Western Standard (2025); Fraser Institute; CER Enbridge Mainline profile | high | 0.1.2.4 |
canada_crude_imports_from_us_mbd | 0.375 | Mb/d US crude into Canada (NB 44%, QC 33%, ON 13%) | 2024 | CAPP, Canadian Imports of US Crude, Natural Gas and Refined Products (Jan 2025); CER 2025 snapshot (0.4 Mb/d) | high | 0.1.2.4 |
gas_price_approval | -0.006 | change in presidential approval per 10-cent rise in gasoline price (1976-2007) | 2016 | Harbridge, Krosnick & Wooldridge (2016), Political Psychology; nonlinear/saturating per Gupta, Pierdzioch & Tiwari (2025), American Politics Research | medium | 0.1.2.4 |
data/commodities/potash.yaml
10 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.3.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
us_net_import_reliance | 0.92 | share of US apparent consumption imported | 2025 | USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Potash | high | 0.1.2.3 |
us_imports_from_canada_share | 0.79 | share of US potash imports from Canada (2021-24 basis) | 2025 | USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Potash (Canada 79%, Russia 12%, Israel 3%, other 6%) | high | 0.1.2.3 |
us_consumption_k2o_t | 5.9 million | tonnes K2O, apparent consumption | 2025 | USGS MCS 2026, Potash (as reported by theworlddata.com summary) | medium | 0.1.2.3 |
canada_production_k2o_t | 15 million | tonnes K2O (~31% of world mine production) | 2025 | USGS MCS 2026 via Fertilizer Daily, 29 May 2026 | high | 0.1.2.3 |
canada_exports_kcl_t | 22.9 million | tonnes KCl (38.7% of world exports); US 53%, Brazil 14%, China 6% | 2024 | Natural Resources Canada, Potash facts | high | 0.1.2.3 |
canada_exports_value_cad | 9 billion | CAD per year | 2025 | Natural Resources Canada, reported by Fertilizer Daily, 30 Sep 2026 | medium | 0.1.2.3 |
export_routes | Rail from 10 Saskatchewan mines to Neptune Terminals (Vancouver); Canpotex also ships ~3 Mt/yr via Portland, Oregon (US soil); Nutrien selected Longview, WA for a new terminal | text | 2025-26 | Nasdaq/Investing News on Nutrien Longview; Railway Age, 'Potash is in the headlines', 2026 | medium | 0.1.2.3 |
price_shock_analogue | 1.78 | potash price increase Apr 2021-Apr 2022 (+178%) when Russia/Belarus supply was disrupted | 2022 | World Bank data via Union of Concerned Scientists, 2022 | medium | 0.1.2.3 |
demand_response_analogue | -0.162 | change in US potash consumption 2020-21 as prices surged | 2021 | USDA ERS, ERR-354 (2023) | high | 0.1.2.3 |
fertilizer_share_farm_costs | 0.15 | share of US farm cash costs (corn ~36-40% of operating costs) | 2022 | USDA AMS fertilizer comment summary; USDA ERS ERR-354; University of Illinois Extension 2025 | medium | 0.1.2.3 |
data/commodities/wildlife.yaml
5 entries. File first appears in 0.1.2.6.1.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
wildlife_vehicle_collisions_per_hour | 4 to 8 | large-animal vehicle collisions per hour in Canada (~35,000-70,000 a year); ~80% deer | 2011 | Transport Canada via State Farm / Canadian Underwriter (2011); BC Wildlife Collision Prevention Program | medium | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife_vehicle_deaths | 570 | people killed in wildlife-vehicle collisions in Canada 2000-2020 (~27 a year); over half moose, ~32% deer; 42% Jun-Aug, 33% Sep-Nov | 2020 | Traffic Injury Research Foundation via eDriving (2024) | high | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife_collisions_dark_share | 0.8 | share of commercial-fleet wildlife collisions in darkness (8 PM-9 AM); Trans-Canada Highway the top corridor | 2026 | Samsara fleet data, April 2026 | medium | 0.1.2.6.1 |
polar_bear_attacks | 73 attacks 1870-2014, 20 deaths, 63 injuries across all five range states; most predatory; most attacks in 2010-2014 (low sea ice) | text | 2017 | Wilder et al. (2017), Wildlife Society Bulletin 41(3) | high | 0.1.2.6.1 |
bear_attacks_north_america | about 11 attacks a year; grizzly ~1.6 and black bear ~1.25 deaths a year in North America | text | 2017 | Secondary compilations (animal-world.com, petpedia) of published studies; low confidence | low | 0.1.2.6.1 |
data/geography/canada_provinces.yaml
1 entries. File first appears in 0.1.3.0.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
canada_provinces | table: units, population, land_area_km2, rural_population_2021, rural_share_2021, weather_regions | 2026-07-01 | Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0009-01, population estimates for July 1, 2026 (preliminary), released 23 September 2026; provincial figures confirmed against the Manitoba Bureau of Statistics quarterly report of the same date; territorial figures as reported from The Daily of 23 September 2026. The 13 figures sum to the published national total of 41,798,407. | 0.1.3.0 |
data/geography/political_geography.yaml
1 entries. File first appears in 0.1.3.2.
| Entry | Value | Unit | As of | Source | Confidence | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
alberta_referendum_2026 | table: remain, start_separation_process, turnout, date | Elections Alberta official results, 29 October 2026, as reported by CBC | 0.1.3.2 |
[3.0]Model parameters
kinetic (7 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
kinetic.attrition_base_rate | 0.006 – 0.01 – 0.016 | fraction of committed force becoming casualties per day at power ratio 1:1 | Dupuy, Attrition (1990): division-level daily casualty rates ~1-2%/day in intense combat; calibrated vs Iraq 2003 | 0.1 |
kinetic.ratio_exponent | 1.5 – 2 – 2.5 | elasticity of attacker casualty rate to (defender/attacker) power ratio; defender uses half this elasticity | Biddle, Military Power (2004): modern-system force employment produces highly lopsided exchange ratios; calibrated vs Iraq 2003 (calibration/iraq_2003_invasion.yaml) | 0.1 |
kinetic.defender_posture_mult | 1.2 – 1.45 – 1.8 | multiplier on defender combat power | Dupuy QJM posture factors (hasty 1.3, prepared 1.5, fortified 1.6+) | 0.1 |
kinetic.kia_fraction | 0.17 – 0.22 – 0.28 | killed / total casualties | US historical KIA:WIA ratios (Iraq/Afghanistan ~1:7 to 1:3); modeller rangejudgement | 0.1 |
kinetic.defender_breakpoint | 0.25 – 0.35 – 0.5 | cumulative casualty fraction at which organized conventional defence collapses | Dupuy / Bracken breakpoint literature: units typically break at 20-40% losses; national armies higher | 0.1 |
kinetic.pursuit_rate_factor | 0.005 – 0.012 – 0.025 | attacker casualty rate after defender breaks, as a fraction of attrition_base_rate | Calibrated vs Iraq 2003 (advance to Baghdad after Iraqi conventional collapse) | 0.1 |
kinetic.air_superiority_mult | 1.5 – 2 – 3 | combat-power multiplier for side holding air superiority | Dupuy (QJM air factors); 1991/2003 Iraq experience; modeller rangejudgement | 0.1 |
occupation (10 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
occupation.density_high_resistance | 20 | troops per 1000 population | Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Stability Operations', Parameters 1995 | 0.1 |
occupation.density_low_resistance | 2.5 | troops per 1000 population | Quinlivan 1995 (permissive environments ~1-4 per 1000) | 0.1 |
occupation.hostile_kia_rate_ref | 9e-05 – 0.00013 – 0.00018 | occupier hostile deaths per troop-month at reference resistance R_ref, before shortfall penalty | Calibrated so the Iraq 2003-11 backtest (calibration/iraq_2003_occupation) reproduces ~3,500 US hostile deaths over ~104 months at ~140k troops; DoD DCAS | 0.1 |
occupation.resistance_relaxation | 0.05 – 0.08 – 0.12 | monthly rate at which resistance moves toward its equilibrium | Modeller estimate; to calibrate on monthly Iraq SIGACTSjudgement | 0.1 |
occupation.shortfall_resistance_gain | 0.25 – 0.4 – 0.55 | equilibrium resistance added per unit of control shortfall | Modeller estimate (Quinlivan's mechanism: too few troops -> insecurity -> more insurgency)judgement | 0.1 |
occupation.resistance_ref | 0.6 | resistance index of the reference case (Iraq 2004-07) | Modeller anchorjudgement | 0.1 |
occupation.insurgency_median_months | 72 – 120 – 168 | months | Connable & Libicki, How Insurgencies End (RAND 2010): median ~10 years | 0.1 |
occupation.external_support_resistance_boost | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3 | additive boost to resistance index per support level above 'diplomatic' | Connable & Libicki 2010; Byman et al. (RAND 2001): external support strongly predicts insurgent durability | 0.1 |
occupation.local_force_substitution | 0 – 0.15 – 0.35 | fraction of density requirement met by collaborating local police/administration | Modeller estimate; Iraq/Afghanistan local-force build-up timelinesjudgement | 0.1 |
occupation.civil_resistance_cost_mult | 0.5 – 1 – 1.5 | scales GDP loss from non-cooperation (strikes, administrative refusal) | Chenoweth & Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works (2011) — qualitative; modeller scalingjudgement | 0.1 |
political (7 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
political.mueller_slope | 0.06 – 0.1 – 0.15 | support drop (fraction) per 10x cumulative own KIA | Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (1973); Gartner & Segura 1998 | 0.1 |
political.casualty_reference | 25 – 50 – 100 | KIA scale in log10(1 + KIA/ref); damps the over-steep early drop of a pure log curve | Fitted by eye to Iraq 2003-08 Gallup support vs DoD cumulative deaths (~-0.25 by 1,000, ~-0.35 by 4,000 incl. non-casualty factors); to fit formally | 0.1 |
political.econ_slope | 0.01 – 0.025 – 0.04 | support drop per 1% GDP loss | Modeller estimate (economic-voting elasticities); to calibratejudgement | 0.1 |
political.withdrawal_threshold | 0.15 – 0.22 – 0.3 | public support below which withdrawal pressure becomes acute | Modeller estimate; Vietnam/Iraq withdrawal support levelsjudgement | 0.1 |
political.withdrawal_max_hazard | 0.01 – 0.025 – 0.05 | monthly probability of termination between elections when support is far below threshold | Executives sustain unpopular wars for years (Iraq 2006-08: support ~30%, no withdrawal until the 2008 SOFA); modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1 |
political.election_hazard_mult | 3 – 5 – 8 | multiplier on withdrawal hazard in a national election month | Modeller estimate; elections are the main institutional exit point (1968, 2008)judgement | 0.1 |
political.capitulation_base_hazard | 0.002 – 0.008 – 0.02 | monthly probability defender government accepts terms, scaled by losses / resolve | UNCALIBRATED modeller estimate. Target for calibration: Hufbauer-Schott-Elliott (~1/3 sanctions success for major goals) vs Pape (<5%); no modern case of a democracy ceding sovereignty to coercionjudgement | 0.1 |
economic (4 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
economic.trade_va_share | 0.45 – 0.6 – 0.75 | domestic value-added share of trade flows lost when trade is disrupted | OECD TiVA order of magnitude; to cite exact Canada-US figures | 0.1 |
economic.supply_chain_amplifier | 1.2 – 1.6 – 2.2 | multiplier on direct trade loss for integrated supply chains (autos, energy) | Modeller estimate; ~50% of bilateral goods trade is intra-firm (analyzify summary of USTR/StatCan)judgement | 0.1 |
economic.oil_shock_gdp_per_mbd | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.35 | % US GDP loss per 1 Mb/d crude supply lost (short run) | Modeller estimate from oil-shock elasticity literature (Hamilton); to calibratejudgement | 0.1 |
economic.allied_sanction_gdp_hit | 0.2 – 0.6 – 1.5 | % US GDP loss when allies impose sanctions | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1 |
mobilization (16 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mobilization.primary_fill | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.8 | fraction of the 100,000 Primary Reserve target actually in uniform when war starts (today 23,561 = 0.24) | Modeller estimate; DMP gives no timeline and CAF converts only ~1 in 13 applicants (NATO Association of Canada 2026)judgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.supplementary_fill | 0.15 – 0.4 – 0.75 | fraction of the 300,000 Supplementary Reserve target enrolled when war starts or reachable within weeks | Modeller estimate; DMP is in design (Globe and Mail); wartime volunteer surge (Ukraine 2022) supports the upper rangejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.arms_fraction | 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.7 | fraction of mobilized supplementary personnel Canada can arm | Modeller estimate; DND documents cite equipment shortages and supply-chain limits (Vincent Rigby, CBC, Dec 2025); 30,000 new rifles ordered from Colt Canada (2026)judgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.primary_cev | 0.45 – 0.6 – 0.75 | combat effectiveness of newly expanded Primary Reserve relative to CAF regulars (=1 of defender CEV) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.supplementary_cev | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3 | combat effectiveness of supplementary reservists (one week of training) relative to CAF regulars | DMP: about one week of training in shooting, moving, communicating, driving and drones (CTV; NPR). Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.primary_arrival_day | 3 – 7 – 14 | days until mobilized Primary Reserve units are in the fight | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.supplementary_arrival_day | 10 – 21 – 45 | days until armed supplementary reservists are organized and in the fight | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.conventional_commit_share | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of armed mobilized personnel committed to the conventional fight (rest held for territorial defence / resistance) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.cadre_resistance_coef | 0.02 – 0.04 – 0.06 | resistance index added per trained, armed survivor per 1,000 population | Modeller estimate; organized pre-war cadres underpin durable resistance (Norway, Baltics 1944-53; Ukraine TDF 2022)judgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.cadre_resistance_cap | 0.25 | maximum resistance index added by cadres | Modeller capjudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.resolve_capitulation_damping | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | proportional cut in defender capitulation hazard when organized mobilization is in place (scaled by fill) | Modeller estimate (whole-of-society defence raises the cost of surrender; Finland model cited in the DMP)judgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.us_guard_mobilized_full | 0.3 – 0.45 – 0.6 | fraction of Guard/Reserve mobilized under full mobilization (vs 5-25% standard) | Modeller estimate; ~1/3 of Guard/Reserve mobilized at peak of Iraq/Afghanistanjudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.us_draft_month | 4 – 6 – 10 | month the draft is enacted (only if occupation control < 0.8) | Modeller estimate; requires Congress to restore induction authority under the Military Selective Service Actjudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.us_draft_inductees | 150,000 – 300,000 – 500,000 | inductees available for occupation duty once trained | Modeller estimate (Vietnam peak ~300k inductions/yr)judgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.us_draft_training_months | 4 – 6 – 9 | months from induction to deployability | Basic + AIT ~ 4-6 months; modeller rangejudgement | 0.1.1 |
mobilization.us_draft_support_penalty | 0.05 – 0.1 – 0.15 | one-time drop in US public support when the draft is enacted | Modeller estimate; Vietnam-era draft oppositionjudgement | 0.1.1 |
weather (8 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
weather.temp_anomaly_sd | 1.5 – 2.5 – 3.5 | °C, standard deviation of the per-run (whole-war) monthly temperature anomaly | Modeller estimate; interannual SD of Canadian winter monthly means is roughly 2-4 °C (ECCC station records)judgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.snow_anomaly_sigma | 0.35 | lognormal sigma on monthly snowfall for the run | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.mobility_penalty | 0.3 – 0.6 – 1 | proportional lengthening of the conventional campaign at severity W = 1 | Modeller estimate; winter campaigns slow sharply (Winter War 1939-40; Russia-Ukraine winter tempo 2022-24)judgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.air_penalty | 0.15 – 0.3 – 0.45 | share of the air-superiority advantage lost at W = 1 (cloud, icing, short days) | Modeller estimate; Montréal is overcast or mostly cloudy ~64% of the time in January (WeatherSpark)judgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.defender_bonus | 0 – 0.1 – 0.2 | added defender posture multiplier at W = 1 (home-adapted troops in prepared positions) | Modeller estimate; Finland 1939-40judgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.cold_injury_rate | 0.0002 – 0.0005 – 0.001 | attacker non-battle cold casualties per soldier per day at cold = 1 (-20 °C mean) | Modeller estimate; cold-weather injury burdens in Korea 1950-51 and Arctic exercisesjudgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.insurgent_winter_lull | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | proportional drop in occupier hostile deaths at W = 1 | Modeller estimate; Afghanistan 'fighting season' seasonalityjudgement | 0.1.2 |
weather.heating_mult | 0.05 – 0.1 – 0.2 | proportional increase in economic pain from disruption at cold = 1 (heating season) | Modeller estimate; to be replaced by the gas/heating set (0.1.12)judgement | 0.1.2 |
seasonal (2 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
seasonal.profile_amplitude | 0.5 – 1 – 1.5 | scales the monthly insurgent-tempo profile (1 = base profile, peak-to-trough ~1.9:1) | Modeller estimate; Afghanistan fighting season (spring-fall peaks, winter lulls in ISAF SIGACTS); Baltic 'Forest Brothers' 1944-53 summer activity and winter bunkersjudgement | 0.1.2.2 |
seasonal.mud_season_penalty | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | proportional lengthening of movement in spring break-up (April); 60% of that at fall freeze-up (November) | Modeller estimate; rasputitsa effects in Ukraine 2022-23; closure of Canadian winter roads at break-upjudgement | 0.1.2.2 |
potash (8 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
potash.substitution_max | 0.25 – 0.45 – 0.65 | share of lost Canadian potash the US can replace from other suppliers once markets adjust | Modeller estimate. Russia/Belarus are the only large alternatives (sanctions; a US-Belarus purchase deal was floated in Sept 2026, Railway Age); Israel, Jordan, Germany, Laos are smaller and committedjudgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.substitution_months | 6 – 12 – 18 | months to reach maximum substitution | Modeller estimate; contract and shipping cyclesjudgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.occupied_mine_output | 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.8 | share of Saskatchewan output that flows south under full US control (workforce, rail and sabotage limits) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.political_weight | 0.03 – 0.06 – 0.1 | drop in US public support when US farmers face a full potash shortfall (level, not cumulative) | Modeller estimate; farm-state political salience of 2022 fertilizer price spike (USDA AMS comment record)judgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.gdp_weight | 0.05 – 0.1 – 0.2 | % US GDP lost at a full potash shortfall (farm incomes, food prices, lagged yields) | Modeller estimate; fertilizer ~15% of farm cash costs (USDA), potash prices +178% in 2021-22 (World Bank)judgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.application_season_mult | 1.4 | multiplier on political effect in spring (Mar-May) and fall (Sep-Nov) application months; 0.6 otherwise | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.offshore_diversion | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | share of US-bound Canadian potash that can be re-sold offshore (Neptune/Vancouver capacity; Portland route lost in war) | Modeller estimate; Canpotex terminal mix (Railway Age 2026)judgement | 0.1.2.3 |
potash.cad_usd | 0.72 | USD per CAD | Approximate 2025-26 rate | 0.1.2.3 |
oil (15 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
oil.basin_share | 0.92 | share of Canadian crude from Alberta+Saskatchewan (scenario may override, e.g. 0.84 for Alberta only) | CER 2025 provincial shares | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.occupied_output | 0.4 – 0.65 – 0.85 | share of basin output that keeps flowing under full US control (skilled workforce, non-cooperation, sabotage risk) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.offshore_diversion | 0 – 0.05 – 0.15 | share of US-bound crude Canada can re-route offshore if flows to the US stop (TMX already ~94% full) | Modeller estimate from TMX utilization (RBN Energy, Aug 2026)judgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.price_per_mbd | 4 – 7 – 12 | USD/bbl world price rise per 1 Mb/d removed from the market (short run) | Modeller estimate; short-run supply/demand elasticity literaturejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.market_adjust_max | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of the removed supply offset by spare capacity and demand response once markets adjust | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.market_adjust_months | 4 – 8 – 14 | months to reach full market adjustment | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.spr_release_mbd | 0.5 – 1 – 1.5 | US Strategic Petroleum Reserve release rate | Modeller estimate; 2022 release ran ~1 Mb/d for six monthsjudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.spr_months | 6 – 12 – 18 | months the SPR release can be sustained | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.midwest_premium_cents | 10 – 20 – 35 | national-average gasoline cents/gal added by Midwest heavy-crude shortage at a full Canadian cut-off | Modeller estimate; PADD 2 runs 73% Canadian crude (Kansas City Fed)judgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.approval_per_10c | 0.003 – 0.006 – 0.009 | US support lost per 10-cent gasoline rise | Harbridge, Krosnick & Wooldridge (2016) | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.approval_cap | 0.04 – 0.07 – 0.1 | maximum support drag from gasoline prices (saturating effect) | Gupta, Pierdzioch & Tiwari (2025) find the penalty flattens past a threshold; cap is a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.east_gdp_weight | 1.5 – 3 – 5 | % Canadian GDP lost at a total loss of eastern crude supply (Line 5 + US crude imports) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.east_dependence | 0.55 – 0.65 – 0.75 | share of Ontario/Quebec/NB refinery crude that arrives via US territory or from the US | CAPP 2025; Line 5 filings (>50% Ontario, ~2/3 Quebec); NB Irving imports US crude | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.east_substitution_max | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of eastern gap covered by seaborne imports (Saint John, Quebec City, Montreal) once arranged | Modeller estimate; contested if US navy interdicts the St. Lawrencejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
oil.east_substitution_months | 1 – 3 – 6 | months to arrange seaborne replacement | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.4 |
electricity (10 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
electricity.hydro_condition | 0.5 – 0.75 – 1.1 | Canadian hydro export capacity relative to a normal-water year (low runoff since 2023) | Hydro-Quebec exports fell from 36 TWh (2021) to 15 TWh (2024); modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.war_disruption_share | 0 – 0.2 – 0.4 | share of general trade disruption that applies to power flows absent a deliberate cut (grids are jointly operated) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.us_support_drag | 0.002 – 0.006 – 0.012 | US support lost at a full cut of normal-water Canadian exports (regional bills; ~15% of US population in affected grids); level, not cumulative | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.us_gdp_weight | 0.01 – 0.03 – 0.06 | % US GDP lost at a full cut of normal-water Canadian exports | Modeller estimate; Canada supplies 32.7 TWh vs ~4,200 TWh US consumptionjudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.blackout_prob | 0.03 – 0.1 – 0.25 | monthly chance of attributable load-shedding in a US import region during peak months (Jun-Aug, Jan) under a full cut | Modeller estimate; NYISO and ISO-NE margins tight in heat waves and cold snapsjudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.blackout_support_effect | -0.03 – 0.01 – 0.04 | lasting change in US support after a blackout blamed on Canada (positive = rally behind the war) | Modeller estimate; Ontario's 2025 surcharge drew escalation, not concessionjudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.occupied_output | 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.85 | share of exports that keep flowing when the US controls the exporting province (remote northern dams and long lines) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.can_gdp_weight | 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.6 | % Canadian GDP lost when US stops exports to Canada, at normal water (rises in drought) | Modeller estimate; BC imported 25% of its needs in fiscal 2024judgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.can_blackout_prob | 0.03 – 0.08 – 0.2 | monthly chance of Canadian load-shedding in winter (Dec-Feb) when US imports are cut | Modeller estimate; Alberta came within ~200 MW of rolling blackouts in Jan 2024judgement | 0.1.2.5 |
electricity.can_blackout_gdp | 0.3 – 1 – 2 | % Canadian GDP lost in a month with load-shedding | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.5 |
weather_complex (19 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
weather_complex.daily_persistence | 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.88 | lag-1 autocorrelation of daily temperature anomalies (cold snaps and warm spells persist) | Modeller estimate; typical mid-latitude daily anomaly persistencejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.daily_sd_winter | 4.5 – 6 – 7.5 | °C, SD of daily temperature anomaly Nov-Mar (continental Canada) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.daily_sd_summer | 2 – 3 – 4 | °C, SD of daily temperature anomaly May-Sep | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.enso_regime | la_nina 0.25, neutral 0.5, el_nino 0.25 | ENSO state for the war's winters | ENSO events recur every 2-7 years (NOAA via Global News 2024); shares are a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.enso_winter_offset_west | 1 – 1.5 – 2.5 | °C winter (Nov-Mar) offset in prairies/oil sands/north/pacific; negative under La Nina, positive under El Nino | Environment Canada: La Nina brings colder-than-normal Prairie winters; El Nino warmer and drier West (Western Producer 2022, 2024); AccuWeather 2021-22: 1.5-2 °C below average southern Prairies | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.enso_winter_offset_east | 0.5 | °C winter offset in the corridor (weaker signal; La Nina wetter in Ontario/Quebec) | Environment Canada via Western Producer (2022) | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.warming_offset | 0.3 – 0.7 – 1.2 | °C by which 2026 conditions exceed the 1991-2020 normals (annual); x1.5 in winter, x1.3 in the north | Canada warmed 2.0 °C over 1948-2023, mostly since 1970, north 2.6 °C, more in winter (CCCR 2026 ch.2); offset relative to the 2005-centred normals is a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.cold_proficiency_attacker | 0.25 – 0.4 – 0.55 | share of cold-weather penalties the US force avoids (training, kit, units); 0.5 = the simple model's implicit level | 11th Airborne is the US Army's only Arctic-capable division (USU 2026; Bloomberg 2026); rest of force largely untrained for extreme cold; modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.cold_proficiency_defender | 0.55 – 0.7 – 0.85 | share of cold-weather penalties Canadian forces avoid (home terrain, winter warfare standard, Rangers) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.air_denied_penalty | 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.8 | share of the air-superiority advantage lost on a fully weather-denied day (blizzard, freezing rain, heavy smoke) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.darkness_penalty | 0.05 – 0.1 – 0.2 | share of air advantage lost at 0 h of daylight relative to 12 h (night-capable forces limit this) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.blizzard_cover | 0 – 0.15 – 0.3 | added insurgent effectiveness on blizzard days (cover, degraded surveillance) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.cold_snap_lull | 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.6 | drop in insurgent tempo on extreme-cold days | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.occupation_cold_strength_loss | 0.002 – 0.005 – 0.01 | share of occupier strength lost per extreme-cold day to cold injuries and kit failure, scaled by (1 - proficiency) | Modeller estimate; Army doctrine notes cold casualties can rival battle casualties (Task & Purpose, 2025)judgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.ice_storm_prob | 0.01 – 0.03 – 0.06 | chance per winter of a 1998-scale multi-day ice storm in the corridor | 1998: 80+ hours of freezing rain vs 45-65 h normal per year; 4 other major events 1958-1998 (Theor. Appl. Climatol. 2000) | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.ice_storm_can_gdp | 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.2 | % Canadian GDP lost in an ice-storm month | Modeller estimate; 1998 storm left 1.4M Quebec customers without power, last restored 6 Febjudgement | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.fire_season_sigma | 0.6 | lognormal sigma of each fire season's severity multiplier on smoke days and fire risk (2023 ~17M ha, 2025 ~8.9M ha vs ~4.2M ha 10-yr avg) | CIFFC via The Weather Network and This Magazine (2025) | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.oil_sands_fire_prob | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | chance per fire season (at severity 1) that wildfire shuts in oil sands output for about a month | 2016 Fort McMurray fire: ~0.8 Mb/d lost on average in May, peak >1.1 Mb/d (EIA, June 2016) | 0.1.2.6 |
weather_complex.oil_sands_fire_mbd | 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.2 | Mb/d shut in during an oil sands fire month | EIA (June 2016); NEB (May 2016) | 0.1.2.6 |
wildlife (10 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
wildlife.vehicle_km_per_troop_day | 15 – 25 – 40 | vehicle-km driven per occupier per day (patrols, convoys, resupply) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.collision_rate_per_mkm | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.35 | large-animal collisions per million vehicle-km on rural/night military routes (civilian average ~0.1-0.2, raised for night and rural exposure) | Modeller estimate from 35-70k collisions a year on ~330 billion vehicle-km (Transport Canada)judgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.collision_fatality | 0.0005 – 0.001 – 0.002 | deaths per large-animal collision (civilian ~27 a year over tens of thousands of collisions; moose far deadlier) | TIRF 2000-2020 via eDriving; modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.collision_injury | 0.03 – 0.07 – 0.1 | injuries per collision | ~7% of wildlife crashes involve injury or death (Transport Canada via animal-world.com) | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.bear_encounter_rate | 0.5 – 1.5 – 4 | dangerous bear encounters per 10,000 troops in bear country per active month (Apr-Nov; polar bears year-round) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.bear_casualty_share | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | share of dangerous encounters that injure someone (armed troops usually shoot first); ~15% of attacks fatal (Wilder et al. 2017) | Modeller estimate; Wilder et al. (2017)judgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.polar_bear_guard_overhead | 0.03 – 0.06 – 0.1 | share of occupier troops in polar-bear range tied up on bear watch and camp security | Modeller estimate; Arctic operations require armed bear monitors (Canadian Rangers' role)judgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.insect_penalty | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | loss of occupier effectiveness in boreal regions in Jun-Aug (blackflies, mosquitoes); locals are acclimatized | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.iconic_incident_prob | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | monthly chance, with US troops in polar-bear range, that troops kill a polar bear in a widely shared incident | Modeller estimate; defence-of-life kills occur in Churchill and Nunavut most yearsjudgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
wildlife.iconic_incident_effect | -0.005 – 0.003 – 0.01 | lasting drop in US support after such an incident (negative = no harm or slight rally) | Modeller estimate; belongs in the narrative module (0.1.21b)judgement | 0.1.2.6.1 |
logistics (16 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
logistics.interdiction_coef | 0.05 – 0.12 – 0.25 | share of occupier supply flow interdicted per unit of resistance index R (sabotage and blockade of road/rail, aggregate) | Modeller estimate; 2020 blockades showed a few sites can halt a quarter of CN's networkjudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.network_fragility | 1.2 – 1.5 – 2 | multiplier on interdiction for Canada's thin east-west corridors (single rail and road links around Lake Superior and through eastern Ontario) | Modeller estimate; Transport Canada 2020 (CN's only eastern link near Belleville)judgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.winter_logistics_mult | 0.5 – 1 – 1.5 | added interdiction effect per unit of blizzard/freezing-rain day share (complex weather) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.shortfall_strength_sensitivity | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.8 | loss of effective occupier strength per unit supply shortfall (stocks and rerouting buffer the rest) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.interdiction_cap | 0.35 | maximum monthly supply shortfall | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.rail_sabotage_can_gdp | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.5 | % Canadian GDP lost per month at full interdiction (the same lines carry Canadian goods) | 2020 blockades: ~0.25% of GDP for the month (RBC via BNN Bloomberg) | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.caf_days_of_supply | 3 – 7 – 15 | days of high-intensity combat before key munitions run short | OAG Oct 2026 (significant stockpile gaps); former CDS Eyre: 'out in days in some cases'; NATO target 30 days | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.caf_ammo_penalty | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | loss of Canadian conventional effectiveness once key munitions are exhausted | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.allied_resupply_relief | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of the munitions penalty removed when allies supply materiel (external level >= materiel) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.can_food_pain | 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.5 | % GDP-equivalent pain for Canada at a full cut of US food imports in winter (half in summer) | Modeller estimate; US supplies 56.5% of vegetable and ~36% of fruit imports (AAFC 2025; UBC)judgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.can_pharma_pain | 0.2 – 0.5 – 1 | % GDP-equivalent pain for Canada at a full cut of US pharmaceutical imports | Modeller estimate; US 30.8% of pharma imports (StatCan 2024)judgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.substitution_max | 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.8 | share of lost US food and drug supply Canada replaces via Mexico, Europe and its own ports | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.substitution_months | 2 – 4 – 6 | months to reach maximum substitution | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.jit_shock_us | 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.6 | % US GDP lost in the first month of a trade cut from just-in-time chains (autos, parts), decaying | Modeller estimate; 2022 Ambassador Bridge blockade shut US and Canadian plants within daysjudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.jit_shock_can | 1 – 2 – 3 | % Canadian GDP lost in the first month of a trade cut from just-in-time chains, decaying | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
logistics.jit_halflife_months | 2 – 3 – 5 | half-life of the just-in-time shock as supply chains reroute | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.7 |
nato (9 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
nato.ceiling_weights | diplomatic 0.25, sanctions 0.4, materiel 0.3, forces 0.05 | highest level of allied response over the war (NATO as an institution is blocked by US veto; this is a coalition of the willing) | Modeller estimate; Greenland 2026 shows allies will deploy symbolic forces before a war, not that they would fight the USjudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.tripwire_escalation | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | probability mass moved up one or two levels when allied troops are in Canada and the US attacks them | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.us_counter_leverage | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.35 | probability mass moved down when the US threatens to abandon European defence (Europe relies on US enablers against Russia) | Modeller estimate; ~80,000 US troops in Europe (AP 2026)judgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.sanctions_month | 1 – 2 – 4 | war month in which coalition sanctions take effect | Modeller estimate; EU sanctions on Russia took days to weeks in 2022judgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.materiel_month | 2 – 4 – 8 | war month in which materiel support reaches Canada | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.forces_month | 2 – 5 – 10 | war month in which allied forces enter (if the ceiling is forces) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.tripwire_casualty_penalty | 0.01 – 0.03 – 0.06 | lasting drop in US support when US forces kill allied soldiers in Canada | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.basing_loss_drag | 0.005 – 0.015 – 0.03 | lasting drop in US support once allies restrict US basing and access (loss of global reach; elite and public reaction) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato.norad_break_posture | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | loss of Canadian defensive posture when NORAD's shared air picture is cut at the outset | Modeller estimate; NORAD is a binational commandjudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms (10 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
arms.domestic_stock_months | 6 – 12 – 24 | months of resistance ammunition from Canadian civilian and cached military stocks at full tempo | Modeller estimate; 2.47M licence holders (RCMP 2025); CAF war stocks have significant gaps (OAG 2026)judgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.ammo_floor | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | resistance lethality multiplier once domestic ammunition is exhausted and nothing arrives | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.black_market_supply | 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.6 | share of resistance ammunition and small-arms need the US-origin black market can meet (profit-driven) | Modeller estimate; US-origin guns dominate Ontario crime guns (91% of handguns, 2024) but only 20% of nationally traced crime guns (RCMP 2023)judgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.black_market_interdiction | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.35 | share of black-market flow stopped (long land border; US enforcement on its own side in wartime) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.state_supply | 0.4 – 0.7 – 1 | share of need met by foreign state shipments when open | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.state_interdiction_normal | 0.2 – 0.35 – 0.5 | share of state shipments intercepted without a declared blockade | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.state_interdiction_blockade | 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.85 | share of state shipments intercepted under a US air and sea blockade of Canada | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.quality_gain | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.4 | added resistance lethality at full supply of military-grade small arms and light weapons (vs hunting rifles and shotguns) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.exposure_prob | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.1 | monthly chance a state shipment is publicly exposed | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.8 |
arms.exposure_us_rally | -0.01 – 0.005 – 0.02 | lasting rise in US support after an exposure ('foreign powers arming insurgents'); negative = no rally or backfire | Modeller estimate; belongs in the narrative module (0.1.21b)judgement | 0.1.2.8 |
nato_members (26 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
nato_members.band_position | -1 – 0 – 1 | where every ally's probabilities sit inside the report's low-high band this run (-1 low, +1 high); shared uncertainty about absolute levels | Deep-research report (12 Nov 2026) s7.2 bands; shared position is a modelling choice | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.common_corr | 0.15 – 0.25 – 0.4 | correlation between any two allies' responses from a common 'European resolve' factor (zero for the US-leaning bloc) | Report s7.4 recommends a common factor but gives no number; modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.delay_jitter_sigma | 0.4 | lognormal sigma on each ally's delay to each tier | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.t4_delay_months | 0.25 – 0.5 – 0.75 | months for a JEF-style or ad hoc deployment | Report s4.2: 1-3 weeks; Greenland Jan 2026 took about 10 days | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.eu_t2_delay_months | 1 – 2 – 6 | months for EU trade countermeasures | Report s4.2: weeks for rebalancing, about six months for the Anti-Coercion Instrument | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.eu_targeted_s1_t2 | 0.4 | chance of EU trade measures under economic coercion when the EU itself is targeted | Report s7.2 and s7.6 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.germany_eu_halving | 0.5 | multiplier on EU collective action when Germany does not reach sanctions | Report s7.4 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.us_counter_chill | 0.05 – 0.075 – 0.1 | drop in second movers' probabilities (blocs B and C, sanctions and above) under US counter-moves | Report s7.4: 5-10pp; Iran-war precedent (5,000 troops ordered out of Germany, floated suspension of Spain) | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.abandon_frontline_shift | 0.05 – 0.1 – 0.2 | drop in frontline states' probabilities (sanctions and above) when the US threatens to abandon Europe's defence | Direction from report s7.4 (frontline states hedge toward Washington); size is a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.abandon_west_shift | 0 – 0.05 – 0.1 | rise in western core states' condemnation and sanctions probabilities under the same threat | Direction from report s7.4 (western states harden); size is a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.russia_concurrent_prob | 0.05 – 0.15 – 0.3 | chance Russia escalates in Europe during the crisis (used when the second-war module is off) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.russia_frontline_shift | 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.4 | drop in frontline states' materiel and forces probabilities if Russia moves | Report s7.4: -20 to -40pp | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.russia_other_shift | 0.1 | same, for other allies | Report s7.4 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.uk_t3_cascade | 0.1 | rise in the core bloc's materiel probability when the UK sends materiel | Report s7.4 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.poland_cascade | 0.05 – 0.15 – 0.25 | rise in the Baltic states' and Romania's sanctions probability when Poland goes beyond words | Direction from report s7.4; size is a modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.killed_allies_t2_shift | 0.15 – 0.2 – 0.25 | rise in sanctions probability across blocs A and B when US forces kill allied personnel | Report s7.4: +15-25pp | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.killed_allies_t4_shift | 0.1 | rise in deployment probability across blocs A and B in the same case | Report s7.4 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.combat_share_bloc_a | 0.1 – 0.18 – 0.25 | share of core-bloc deployers that would fight US forces (zero for other blocs) | Report s7.2 and s8: direct combat is about 10-25% of deployments for Bloc A | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.combat_saturation_share | 0.25 | share of non-US NATO GDP among combatants at which the forces strength reaches 1 | Modeller estimate (about France plus the UK)judgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.materiel_saturation_share | 0.15 – 0.25 – 0.4 | share of non-US NATO GDP among donors at which materiel strength reaches its ceiling | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.delivery_feasibility_s3 | 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.5 | share of materiel that reaches an invaded Canada (US controls the sea and air approaches) | Report s8: about 0.3-0.5 in a full invasion | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.delivery_feasibility_s2 | 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.9 | same, in a limited seizure | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.sanctions_reference | 0.6 – 0.75 – 0.9 | combined basing-and-economic weight at which sanctions strength reaches 1 (the report's central split holds about 75% of non-US NATO GDP and 77% of US troops in Europe) | Report s7.5; mapping to model strength is a modelling choice | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.reform_uk_mult | 0.5 | multiplier on all UK probabilities under a Reform-led government | Report s7.6 | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.rn_france_mult | 0.5 | multiplier on France's probabilities under an RN presidency | Modeller estimate; report s7.6 says an RN win removes the lead moverjudgement | 0.1.2.11 |
nato_members.rn_bloc_a_shift | 0.1 – 0.125 – 0.15 | drop in the rest of the core bloc's condemnation and sanctions probabilities under an RN presidency | Report s7.6: 10-15pp | 0.1.2.11 |
allied_air (14 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
allied_air.offer_given_materiel | 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.6 | chance allies offer to fly a combat air patrol over Canada when their response reaches materiel but not ground forces (used when offer is 'auto') | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.coverage | 0.1 – 0.25 – 0.45 | share of the theatre and clock an allied air patrol can cover with warning (continental frontage, few tankers, long transit) | Modeller estimate; air refuelling and enablers are a known European shortfall, and much of NATO's enabling structure runs on US systems (deep-research report s4.1)judgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.no_warning_mult | 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.5 | multiplier on coverage when the patrol has to deploy after the attack starts | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.us_platform_penalty | 0.15 – 0.3 – 0.45 | loss of coverage because part of the allied fighter fleet depends on US-controlled support (F-35 software, spares, logistics) | Modeller estimate; 12 European states had 466 F-35s on order or preselected (SIPRI, March 2026, via the deep-research report)judgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.us_engages_prob | 0.25 – 0.5 – 0.75 | chance the US attacks the allied patrol instead of working around it | Modeller estimate; in the Greenland crisis the US backed down rather than push allied troops aside, but nothing was at stake militarilyjudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.denial_effect | 0.5 – 0.75 – 1 | share of the US air-superiority advantage removed where and while a respected patrol flies | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.occupation_effect | 0.05 – 0.15 – 0.3 | loss of occupier effectiveness at full coverage (less air support and surveillance) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.capitulation_damping | 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.5 | cut in Canada's capitulation hazard at full coverage (a government and territory under allied air cover) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.delivery_gain | 0.2 – 0.5 – 1 | rise in materiel delivery at full coverage (an air bridge stays open) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.survival_months | 0.1 – 0.3 – 1 | months an engaged patrol lasts against US air power | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.shootdown_support_penalty | 0.02 – 0.05 – 0.09 | lasting drop in US support when US forces shoot down allied aircraft | Modeller estimate; larger than the ground tripwire penalty because the US chose to fire first on allies in the airjudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.escalation_prob | 0.05 – 0.15 – 0.3 | chance that allies who lose aircraft enter the war instead of standing down | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.escalation_forces | 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.7 | allied forces strength (0-1) if they enter the war | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
allied_air.war_risk_mult | 1.2 – 1.5 – 2 | multiplier on the US withdrawal hazard while allied aircraft are being engaged or after allies enter (risk of a wider war) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war (16 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
second_war.base_hazard_monthly | 0.001 – 0.003 – 0.008 | monthly chance that some adversary attacks a US ally or partner, before opportunism | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.tied_down_mult | 0.5 – 1.5 – 3 | rise in that hazard at full US commitment in Canada (share of sustainable ground forces deployed) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.alliance_break_mult | 0.5 – 1.5 – 3 | rise in that hazard when allies have fully broken with the US (sanctions strength 1) | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.theatre_weights | europe 0.35, pacific 0.35, korea 0.1, middle_east 0.2 | where the second war starts | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.defend_prob_base | 0.4 – 0.65 – 0.85 | chance the US defends the attacked ally when the alliance is intact | Modeller estimate; ECFR (June 2026): majorities in all 15 countries polled doubt the US would come to their aidjudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.defend_integrity_power | 1 | exponent on alliance integrity (1 - share of that region's allies that have broken with the US) | Modelling choice | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.ground_demand | {'europe': 0.3, 'pacific': 0.12, 'korea': 0.35, 'middle_east': 0.15} | share of sustainable US ground forces a defended second war pulls away from Canada | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.air_demand | {'europe': 0.35, 'pacific': 0.55, 'korea': 0.4, 'middle_east': 0.3} | share of US air power pulled away | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.us_gdp_hit | {'europe': 1.0, 'pacific': 5.0, 'korea': 2.0, 'middle_east': 1.0} | % US GDP lost per year while the second war lasts, if the US fights (half if it stays out) | Modeller estimate; Bloomberg Economics (2024) put a Taiwan war at about 10% of world GDP, more for the economies involvedjudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.air_strength_weight | 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.35 | loss of occupier effectiveness in Canada when all US air power is pulled away | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.two_war_withdrawal_mult | 1.5 – 2.5 – 4 | multiplier on the US withdrawal hazard from Canada while it fights a second war | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.rally_effect | -0.03 – 0.02 – 0.06 | lasting change in US support for the Canada war when the US enters a second war (positive = rally) | Modeller estimate; uncertain signjudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.abandon_support_drop | 0 – 0.02 – 0.05 | lasting drop in US support when the US leaves an attacked ally undefended | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.europe_aid_suppression | 0.5 – 0.75 – 0.95 | cut in European materiel and forces for Canada once Europe is itself at war | Deep-research report s7.4: -20 to -40pp on frontline states' materiel and forces, -10pp elsewhere; converted to a cut in strength (modeller estimate)judgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.europe_reconcile_prob | 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.8 | chance that Europeans drop sanctions and basing limits on the US when the US defends them | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
second_war.duration_months | 3 – 12 – 36 | length of the second war | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.2.12 |
spatial (17 parameters)
| Parameter | Value or low – likely – high | Unit | Source | Added in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
spatial.rural_dispersion_coef | 0 – 0.5 – 1 | extra troops per person needed as the rural share of a province rises (requirement x [1 + coef x (rural share - national rural share)]) | Modeller estimate. Force-ratio studies give troops per 1,000 people without a settlement term; the low end means dispersion does not matterjudgement | 0.1.3.1 |
spatial.presence_per_100k_km2 | 100 – 300 – 800 | troops needed per 100,000 km2 of land simply to be present, whatever the population | Modeller estimate; no historical anchor for holding very large, nearly empty territory. Uses total land area, which overstates the need where land is uninhabitedjudgement | 0.1.3.1 |
spatial.local_shock_share | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of the month-to-month variation in occupier casualties that is local to a province rather than shared nationally | Modeller estimatejudgement | 0.1.3.1 |
spatial.compression_opposition | 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 | share of each province's peacetime gap from the national level in opposition that survives an overt invasion (1 = gaps unchanged, 0 = gaps vanish) | Research report, 13 Nov 2026: after Russia's 2022 invasion regional gaps in Ukraine largely closed (KIIS: 83% east, 85% south opposed concessions; civic identity 77-82% in every region); Canada's 2025 tariff shock moved opinion the same way. Analytical estimatejudgement | 0.1.3.2 |
spatial.compression_armed | 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.9 | share of each province's gap in armed propensity that survives an overt invasion | Research report, 13 Nov 2026: capacity proxies (firearms, rural skills) do not converge the way attitudes do. Analytical estimatejudgement | 0.1.3.2 |
spatial.pacified_residual | 0.08 – 0.15 – 0.2 | share of a province's resistance that remains once it is pacified (it then needs only a holding garrison) | Research report, 17 Nov 2026: residual violence in pacified regions was 8-20% of peak (Anbar 12-17%, Ramadi 16%, Malaya 13%, Basra 8%). Was 0.05/0.15/0.30 (modeller estimate) before v0.1.3.5judgement | 0.1.3.4 |
spatial.consolidation_share | 0.9 | share of the occupied population that must live in pacified provinces for the occupation to count as consolidated | Modeller choice, so that one small province holding out does not block the outcomejudgement | 0.1.3.4 |
spatial.pacify_median_months | 12 – 24 – 48 | median months for a contested province to go quiet once the delay has passed, with the occupier at full strength there and moderate resistance | Research report: contested regions that went quiet took a median of 50 months from the start of the conflict (n=23), but about 3-19 months from when the occupier had enough force and local partners. Recommended 12 / 24 / 48 | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.pacify_delay_months | 12 – 15 – 18 | months after the occupier arrives in a province before it can go quiet at all | Research report: no contested region in the case table went quiet before month 24; recommends a near-zero hazard for the first 12-18 months | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.pacify_control_exponent | 0.5 – 1 – 2 | how strongly the chance of going quiet depends on the occupier's strength in the province (2 = the national formula; lower = weaker) | Modeller estimate, informed by the research report: troop density is only weakly linked to outcome (Friedman 2011: raising density from 5 to 80 per 1,000 adds under 15 points to success; Connable and Libicki: ratios 'neither accurate nor predictive')judgement | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.hard_province_share | 0.2 – 0.275 – 0.35 | chance that a contested province is one of the hard ones that rarely go quiet | Research report: about 25-30% of contested regions never went quiet while the conflict lasted (Ninewa, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, Helmand, Kandahar, Belfast, Derry, South Armagh) | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.hard_median_months | 60 – 78 – 96 | median months to quiet for a hard province, at full strength | Research report: hostile, identity-mobilized regions, median 60-96 months or more | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.late_drop_month | 78 | months after arrival beyond which a province that is still contested becomes much less likely to go quiet | Research report: regions not quiet by about year 6-7 almost never went quiet | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.late_drop_mult | 0.1 | multiplier on the chance of going quiet after late_drop_month | Modeller choice implementing the research finding abovejudgement | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.relapse_base_monthly | 0.001 – 0.002 – 0.003 | monthly chance a pacified province turns violent again while its garrison is kept up and there is no outside support | Research report: 0 of about 48 Malayan White Areas relapsed in 1953-60; about 13% of early Philippine civil provinces did, within months. Recommended 0.1-0.3% a month | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.relapse_shortfall_monthly | 0.02 – 0.03 – 0.04 | added monthly chance of relapse when the garrison is entirely absent (scaled by the shortfall) | Research report: Iraqi Sunni provinces relapsed about 2-2.5 years after the US left; 2-4% a month | 0.1.3.5 |
spatial.relapse_outside_monthly | 0.01 | added monthly chance of relapse at full outside support for the resistance (scaled by allied materiel and forces) | Research report: the Afghan north relapsed after 7-8 years as outside pressure grew; about 1% a month | 0.1.3.5 |
[4.0]Reference lists by version
- 0.1.2.3 Potash (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.4 Oil (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.5 Electricity exports (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.6 Complex weather (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.6.1 Bears and wildlife (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.7 Supply chains and logistics (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.8 NATO and allies (1 sources)
- 0.1.2.8.1 Foreign small arms shipments (1 sources)
- 0.1.3.0 Provinces as separate areas: the skeleton (3 sources)
- 0.1.3.1 Population and geography by province (3 sources)
- 0.1.3.2 Political geography by province (8 sources)
- 0.1.3.2.1 Alberta baseline corrected (5 sources)
- 0.1.3.3 Resources by province (5 sources)
- 0.1.3.6 Today's reserves against the 400,000 plan (4 sources)