Roadmap / 0.1.2.8
NATO and allies
v0.1.2.8, commit 6a5eab2. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.2.8_nato.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.
Switch: nato.enabled (off by default). When on, the module owns the external-support level and makes it change over time; when off, the scenario's fixed external.level is used as before. Options: nato.response (draw, or force diplomatic / sanctions / materiel / forces), nato.tripwire_troops, nato.us_threatens_europe.
Runs: 2,000 per variant, seed 20261105, every earlier module on (no embargoes). Backtests pass; 18 tests pass.
Assumption: NATO as an institution is blocked
Article 5 obliges allies to assist but leaves each free to decide how, and the North Atlantic Council decides by consensus. The treaty has no procedure for one member attacking another and no way to expel a member, so the US can veto any collective response. What the module models is a coalition of the willing.
What the module does
- Ceiling: each run draws the highest level the allied response reaches. Base weights: diplomatic only 25%, sanctions 40%, materiel 30%, forces 5%.
- Ramp: sanctions arrive in war month 1–4, materiel in month 2–8, forces in month 2–10.
- Tripwire: allied troops stationed in Canada before the war raise the ceiling when attacked and cost the US support when killed. The precedent is Greenland, January 2026: seven European allies sent small contingents (France 15, Germany 13). The US answered with tariffs and said the troops would not change its decision.
- US counter-leverage: a threat to abandon Europe's defence lowers the ceiling. About 80,000 US troops are in Europe.
- Basing loss: once allies sanction, they restrict US basing and access. This is a lasting drag on US support.
- NORAD break: Canada loses the shared air picture at the outset.
- Out of scope: UK and French nuclear deterrence.
Results (chance the US quits)
| Variant | Full annexation | Alberta detachment | Economic coercion |
|---|---|---|---|
| NATO off (scenario default) | 64.0% | 48.3% | 33.0% |
| NATO on, response drawn | 69.1% | 56.7% | 42.2% |
| On, no US threat to Europe | 70.0% | 55.6% | 41.1% |
| On, 5,000 allied tripwire troops | 69.2% | 63.8% | – |
| Forced: paralysed (diplomatic only) | 64.0% | 45.4% | 31.8% |
| Forced: sanctions | 67.4% | 57.6% | 47.7% |
| Forced: materiel | 71.2% | 63.8% | 46.7% |
| Forced: forces | 84.3% | 79.0% | – |
With the response drawn, the allied ceiling comes out at about 35% diplomatic only, 38% sanctions, 23–28% materiel and 3–4% forces.
Findings
- The allied response is worth 5–9 points to Canada. That is more than any economic lever except the oil embargo.
- Sanctions do most of the work. Moving from paralysis to sanctions adds 3–16 points; moving on to materiel adds less. In economic coercion, sanctions alone nearly match materiel. Allies don't need to ship weapons to matter.
- Allied combat forces would be decisive but are unlikely. The US quits in 79–84% of runs when they arrive, but the model gives them a 3–4% chance.
- A tripwire works where the fight is small. 5,000 allied troops add 7 points in the Alberta detachment and nothing in full annexation, where the war is already big enough to draw the allied response it will draw.
- The US threat to abandon Europe barely matters (about 1 point). The model treats it as a modest shift in allied willingness; that is a modeller estimate and could be too low.
- If the allies are paralysed, Canada is worse off than the old default in the Alberta detachment (45% vs 48%), because the old scenario default sometimes drew sanctions.
Weakest parameters
ceiling_weights (decisive, and a modeller estimate), us_counter_leverage, tripwire_escalation, basing_loss_drag, the ramp months.
Sources
NATO, "Collective defence and Article 5"; Belfer Center Article 5 explainer; AP (15 Jan 2026), Euromaidan Press (15 and 20 Jan 2026) and The Aviationist (16 Jan 2026) on Greenland; AP (May 2026) and Air & Space Forces Magazine (June 2026) on US forces in Europe.