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Political geography by province

Version 0.1.3.2, 13 Nov 2026. tag v0.1.3.2, commit 4bce5a1. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1.3.2_political_geography.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.

Switch: spatial.enabled (political geography is now part of the default; spatial.politics: false gives v0.1.3.1).
Options: politics, wartime_compression, politics_reference (national / theatre), overrides (fix a province's multipliers for an excursion).
Runs: 3,000 paired runs per variant, every other module on. 27 tests pass; all harness checks pass.
Scope: provinces as aggregates. Public opinion and public statistics only. No sites, methods or tactics.
Inputs: the research report of 13 November 2026. Its numbers are analytical estimates built from pollsters' releases, not forecasts.

Headline

Provinces now start with different levels of resistance, and it changes nothing about who wins. The chance the US quits is identical with and without political geography in every one of 3,000 runs, in both occupation scenarios, and stays identical under every excursion tried (Quebec at either end of its range, Alberta or the Prairies accommodating, Atlantic Canada and the North at the top of theirs).

That is a property of how the model is built, not evidence that provincial politics is irrelevant. The reason is below, and it says what has to come next.

The one result that does move an outcome is about the Alberta scenario's own input: the research does not support the low armed propensity that scenario assumes. Using the research value raises the chance the US quits Alberta by 2.4 points (1.7 to 3.1) and US deaths by 36%.

What the research found

  • Opposition to annexation is overwhelming everywhere and varies little: about ±5% around the national level. Alberta and Saskatchewan are lowest, Atlantic Canada highest, and Quebec does not differ from Ontario.
  • Armed propensity varies more: roughly ±15 to 30%. Quebec is lowest on stated willingness to fight; Newfoundland and Labrador and the North are highest, mostly on firearms licences per person (2.4 times the national rate).
  • Alberta: in the 19 October 2026 referendum 74.95% voted to remain in Canada on 70.4% turnout. Support for joining the US specifically is 6% in Leger's three-way question and 24% in Research Co.'s standalone question. Albertans' stated willingness to die for Canada (51%) is above the national figure (46%).
  • Quebec: the most anti-Trump province (6 to 10% favourable) and the most likely to be "absolutely against" joining the US, but last on every measure of willingness to serve or fight. The data cannot say whether that is weak attachment to Canada or a nationalism that would fight as Quebec. The range for Quebec is wide for that reason.
  • An overt invasion narrows the gaps. Regional differences in Ukraine largely closed after 2022. The report recommends keeping about half of each province's peacetime gap in opposition and about 70% of its gap in armed propensity.

How it enters the model

  • Each province has two multipliers relative to the national average, each with a low, central and high value: opposition and armed propensity. Each run draws them, with provinces in the same block (Prairies; Atlantic; Ontario, BC and Manitoba) moving together.
  • They are rescaled so the population-weighted national average is exactly 1. The national level stays what the scenario says; the provinces only share it out differently.
  • Wartime compression then pulls each province toward the average (opposition gaps × 0.3 to 0.7; armed gaps × 0.5 to 0.9).
  • Starting resistance in a province = the national value + (the popular part of it) × (multiplier − 1). Trained cadres, strategy and allied support are shared equally.
  • In the Alberta scenario the resistance values are already Alberta's own, so the multipliers are applied relative to the theatre and make no second adjustment.

Where resistance starts (full annexation, average over runs)

Province Multiplier (10th to 90th percentile) Starting resistance, 0 to 1 Troops per 1,000 people Basis of the opposition figure
Newfoundland and Labrador 1.22 (1.14 to 1.30) 0.60 11.5 Regional (Atlantic)
The North 1.16 (1.07 to 1.25) 0.57 62.2 Analyst estimate; no polling exists
New Brunswick 1.14 (1.09 to 1.20) 0.57 10.5 Regional (Atlantic)
Nova Scotia 1.11 (1.06 to 1.16) 0.55 9.9 Regional (Atlantic)
Saskatchewan 1.07 (1.01 to 1.13) 0.54 10.2 Regional (Manitoba and Saskatchewan)
Prince Edward Island 1.04 (0.98 to 1.09) 0.52 10.1 Regional (Atlantic)
British Columbia 1.03 (1.00 to 1.07) 0.52 8.6 Provincial polling
Manitoba 1.03 (0.98 to 1.07) 0.52 9.6 Regional
Alberta 1.02 (0.97 to 1.06) 0.52 8.6 Provincial polling
Ontario 0.97 (0.95 to 0.99) 0.50 8.2 Provincial polling
Quebec 0.97 (0.91 to 1.02) 0.49 8.6 Provincial polling

Without political geography every province starts at 0.51.

Alberta comes out slightly above average in a full annexation. Its lower opposition is outweighed by higher armed propensity. Quebec and Ontario are the two below average, Quebec because of stated willingness to fight and Ontario because of low firearms ownership. Every armed-propensity magnitude is an analyst construct on thin regional data.

Results: chance the US quits

Variant Full annexation Alberta detachment
Geography only (v0.1.3.1) 70.5% 59.2%
With political geography 70.5%, change exactly 0 59.2%, change exactly 0
Without wartime compression (peacetime gaps) 0.0 (0.0 to +0.1) 0
Quebec at the top of its range ("fights as Quebec") exactly 0 n/a
Quebec at the bottom of its range 0.0 (−0.1 to +0.1) n/a
Alberta opposition cut to 0.80 exactly 0 n/a
Alberta and Saskatchewan opposition cut to 0.80 exactly 0 n/a
Atlantic Canada and the North at the top of their ranges exactly 0 n/a
Alberta scenario with research-based armed propensity n/a +2.4 (1.7 to 3.1)

US deaths in full annexation change by 2 (of 1,650). About 1,900 troops move out of Ontario and 1,300 out of Quebec, mainly to Atlantic Canada, British Columbia and Saskatchewan.

Why it changes nothing, and what that means

Three features of the model make provincial differences cancel exactly at the national level: 1. The multipliers are normalized. They share the national level out; they do not raise or lower it. 2. Every response to resistance is a straight line: troops needed, US casualties and how resistance evolves all scale in proportion. A straight-line model gives the same national total however the resistance is distributed. 3. Troops are spread in proportion to need, so every province gets the same fraction of what it needs and the same control.

Real occupations are not like that. Provinces would be pacified or lost one at a time, the US would choose where to concentrate, and a province that is quiet frees troops for one that is not. None of that is in the model yet. So the honest reading is: the provincial split is now populated with real differences, and the model has no mechanism through which they can matter. The next two versions supply the mechanisms: - v0.1.3.3 resources: gives provinces different value to the US. - v0.1.3.4 allocation and provincial outcomes: the US chooses where to put troops, and provinces can be pacified or held separately. This is the version where political geography should start to show. I recommend adding province-level pacification there, which I had left as a national event.

I also tried occupying only part of the country (Alberta and Saskatchewan; British Columbia; Ontario and Quebec; Atlantic Canada; the North). Political geography moved those results by at most 0.4 points. Those runs reuse the full-annexation settings for everything else, so their absolute numbers are not valid results and are not reported; partial occupation needs its own design in v0.1.3.4.

Decision for Kevin: the Alberta scenario's armed propensity

The Alberta scenario sets armed propensity at 0.15 to 0.50 (mode 0.30), two-thirds of the national value. That was my estimate, made before this research. The research points the other way: Albertans who oppose are at least as willing to fight as other Canadians (51% would die for Canada against 46% nationally; firearms licences 1.3 times the national rate). The research-based value would be 0.27 to 0.76 (mode 0.49).

Current Research-based
Chance the US quits Alberta 59.2% 61.6%
US military deaths 227 308
US troops needed 54,500 67,200

The scenario's lower opposition (0.70 against 0.88 nationally) matches the research's recommendation for a detachment (0.75 to 0.85 of national) and should stay. I have not changed the baseline.

Limits

  • Data quality. Nearly every poll is an opt-in online panel. Outside Ontario, Quebec, BC and Alberta, provincial subsamples are often under 150. No poll separates the four Atlantic provinces or Saskatchewan from Manitoba on annexation, and none covers the territories. No annexation poll with regional tables was found after the January 2026 Greenland crisis.
  • Armed propensity is a construct: 60% stated willingness, 40% the square root of firearms licences per person. Licences measure hunting and rural life more than anything else.
  • Indigenous peoples' stance is not modelled. The report found no survey and advises treating it as a separate, high-variance factor in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and the North.
  • No split inside provinces. The report recommends treating Alberta under a detachment as two populations (the cities resist, the rural belt is more accommodating). Units are whole provinces.
  • Provincial governments are not actors yet. The report's judgment of each government's posture is stored in the data file for a later module.
  • The report's correlation between blocks (a national common factor) is left out, because the multipliers are relative to a national level the scenario already draws.

Sources

The research report (task wf-1b190919, 13 November 2026) lists its sources in full. The principal ones: - Daoust, "The 51st State? Exploring Canadian Attitudes Towards US Annexation and Their Determinants", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16 June 2026 (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-political-science-revue-canadienne-de-science-politique/article/51st-state-exploring-canadian-attitudes-towards-us-annexation-and-their-determinants/FDC9E14505B5FBAF6A7C01E6DDDA9302). - Leger, Alberta Pulse Check, June 2026; Leger national polls, December 2024 and March 2025 (via CBC, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/canada-u-s-51st-state-annexation-1.7490806). - Angus Reid Institute, January 2025 (https://angusreid.org/canada-51st-state-trump/) and July 2025 (https://angusreid.org/canada-volunteer-military-service/). - Ipsos for Global News, January 2026 (https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/half-canadians-would-join-preparation-program-if-invasion-occurs). - Environics for the Cascade Institute, 2025 and 2026 (https://cascadeinstitute.org/willing-to-fight/). - RCMP, 2025 Commissioner of Firearms Report (https://rcmp.ca/en/corporate-information/publications-and-manuals/2025-commissioner-firearms-report). - Elections Alberta official referendum results, as reported by CBC (https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/alberta-referendum-official-results-9.7401791). - Research Co., December 2024 (https://researchco.ca/2024/12/20/unity-canada-3/).