Force on ForcePrime Rogue Inc.
A grognard exercise, not a scientific model. What that means

Roadmap / 0.1

The base game: four layers

Version 0.1, 5 Nov 2026. tag v0.1, commit 1fb740f. File docs/RESULTS_v0.1_can_us.md.
Written at this version and not revised since. Later versions may change these numbers; see the roadmap.

These results come from 2,000 Monte Carlo runs per variant (36,000 runs in total), seed 20261105. Every run assumes the war has already started; the model gives the distribution of outcomes if it does, not the probability that it happens.

Reproduce with:

python -m forceonforce.cli run scenarios/can_us/*.yaml -n 2000

Backtests (must pass before results are read)

Case Model median (p10–p90) Observed
Iraq 2003 invasion, US KIA 157 (93–278) ~139 (DoD, all causes to 1 May 2003)
Iraq 2003–11 occupation, US hostile KIA 3,545 (2,879–4,325) ~3,500

The occupation backtest is in-sample: the casualty rate was tuned to it. Out-of-sample validation is the first item on the roadmap.

Results

Scenario Variant Kinetic days End month US KIA median (p10–p90) Canadian deaths US fiscal $bn US GDP loss % CAN GDP loss % Troops needed / available Outcomes % (consolidated / US withdraws / Canada capitulates / coercion succeeds / coercion abandoned / unresolved)
alberta_detachment forward_defence · europe_backs_canada 12 23 151 (59–403) 5,408 48 1.7 16.5 37k / 375k 17 / 47 / 32 / 0 / 0 / 4
alberta_detachment forward_defence · isolated 12 21 119 (53–252) 5,177 35 1.0 16.0 30k / 371k 20 / 33 / 44 / 0 / 0 / 4
alberta_detachment preserve_force · europe_backs_canada 11 22 164 (64–515) 2,383 63 1.7 17.0 51k / 373k 15 / 49 / 32 / 0 / 0 / 4
alberta_detachment preserve_force · isolated 11 22 134 (57–333) 2,258 55 1.0 16.6 43k / 371k 19 / 36 / 42 / 0 / 0 / 4
arctic_seizure europe_backs_canada 11 30 6 (3–17) 349 2 1.4 12.1 1k / 207k 23 / 37 / 29 / 0 / 0 / 11
arctic_seizure isolated 11 29 5 (2–10) 336 1 0.8 11.6 1k / 207k 30 / 26 / 35 / 0 / 0 / 9
economic_coercion canada_cuts_oil · europe_backs_canada 0 60 0 (0–0) 0 0 2.4 14.3 0k / 284k 0 / 0 / 0 / 16 / 23 / 61
economic_coercion canada_cuts_oil · isolated 0 60 0 (0–0) 0 0 1.7 14.4 0k / 284k 0 / 0 / 0 / 20 / 19 / 60
economic_coercion oil_keeps_flowing · europe_backs_canada 0 60 0 (0–0) 0 0 1.8 14.2 0k / 284k 0 / 0 / 0 / 16 / 19 / 66
economic_coercion oil_keeps_flowing · isolated 0 60 0 (0–0) 0 0 1.2 14.3 0k / 284k 0 / 0 / 0 / 21 / 13 / 66
full_annexation manufactured_crisis_rally · forward_defence · europe_backs_canada 27 40 2,609 (441–8,737) 15,825 841 2.4 21.1 580k / 373k 7 / 20 / 63 / 0 / 0 / 9
full_annexation manufactured_crisis_rally · forward_defence · isolated 27 32 1,740 (390–6,097) 12,308 664 1.8 20.6 498k / 371k 10 / 12 / 71 / 0 / 0 / 7
full_annexation manufactured_crisis_rally · preserve_force · europe_backs_canada 27 37 3,408 (638–10,679) 16,123 799 2.4 21.6 713k / 373k 3 / 25 / 63 / 0 / 0 / 9
full_annexation manufactured_crisis_rally · preserve_force · isolated 27 31 2,567 (522–8,062) 12,621 663 1.8 21.3 634k / 372k 4 / 15 / 75 / 0 / 0 / 6
full_annexation no_casus_belli · forward_defence · europe_backs_canada 27 15 1,069 (293–3,693) 9,086 316 2.4 21.0 576k / 372k 4 / 67 / 29 / 0 / 0 / 0
full_annexation no_casus_belli · forward_defence · isolated 27 15 830 (275–2,751) 8,158 316 1.8 20.6 493k / 372k 4 / 58 / 37 / 0 / 0 / 0
full_annexation no_casus_belli · preserve_force · europe_backs_canada 27 16 1,485 (380–4,674) 7,654 327 2.4 21.5 712k / 372k 2 / 67 / 30 / 0 / 0 / 1
full_annexation no_casus_belli · preserve_force · isolated 27 16 1,248 (342–3,883) 6,756 329 1.8 21.2 628k / 371k 2 / 59 / 39 / 0 / 0 / 0

What the model says, and how much to trust each finding

  1. The conventional war is short and does not decide the outcome. It takes about 4 weeks to reach the national objectives. Canada's organized defence breaks well before that. This is robust: it holds at any plausible force ratio.
  2. The troop arithmetic doesn't close. Holding all of Canada at Quinlivan densities needs a median of roughly 490k–710k troops, against a sustainable US ceiling of about 370k without a draft. Control stays at 50–70% and the resistance feeds on the gap. This is robust: it is basic arithmetic on population and force structure.
  3. US public support at the outset is the single biggest driver. With no casus belli (polling at 2% support for force, rising to around 18% with a rally), the modal outcome is US withdrawal within about 15 months (58–67% of runs). With a manufactured crisis and a rally, the war lasts about 3 years, US deaths roughly double, and the modal outcome becomes Canadian capitulation (63–75%). Ranking runs by initial support moves the withdrawal rate from 64% in the bottom quarter to 8% in the top quarter. Armed-resistance propensity barely moves outcomes; it mostly moves casualties. The direction of this finding is robust. The capitulation share rests on the least-calibrated parameter in the model.
  4. Consolidated annexation is rare in every variant. It occurs in 2–10% of full-annexation runs and 15–30% of limited-aims runs. Insurgencies outlast decade-long horizons when the occupier is short of troops.
  5. Canada's strategy choice is a trade-off. Preserving the force (disengaging early and dispersing) cuts Canadian deaths by about 15% in the short full-scale war, makes no difference in the long (rally) war, and cuts them by about 55% in Alberta. It raises US deaths by roughly 30–50% and slightly lowers the chance of consolidation. It does not change who wins the conventional phase.
  6. European backing adds 8–14 points to US withdrawal and lowers Canadian capitulation. Most of the effect runs through sanctions and through the risk of a wider war if allied troops deploy.
  7. Limited aims are militarily cheap but not politically free. The Arctic seizure costs about 5 US KIA but still ends in US withdrawal or Canadian capitulation about two-thirds of the time. The economic damage of being at war with Canada is the main cost.
  8. Economic coercion alone usually leaves things unresolved after 5 years (60–66%). Canada takes about 14% annualized GDP loss; the US takes 1–2.4%. Cutting oil exports raises US pain but changes outcomes only modestly. The success rate (16–21%) is pinned by a parameter set from Pape's sanctions-failure finding, not fitted.

Parameters these results are most sensitive to (fix first)

politics.attacker_initial_support, political.capitulation_base_hazard, resistance.armed_propensity, and the economic coefficients. See docs/ROADMAP.md.